Introduction
This paper explores the prospects for a structural account of propositional justification.
The account is structural in at least two respects. First, it helps to negotiate which formal principles govern this notion, using a limited set of axioms and rules. Secondly, it is largely silent on the issue of what grounds such justification, and so on what propositional justification materially consists in. In particular, the account is consistent both with internalism about justification and with its externalist opposition.
The account is furthermore neutral on the debate between epistemic contextualists and their invariantist opponents. It likewise coheres both with Williamson's so-called knowledge-first approach and with its rejection.
The account elucidates justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Being factive, the notion of one's being in a position to know is stronger than the notion of its merely being possible for one to know. The account thus differs from recent attempts to analyse justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing (Bird 2007; Ichikawa Jenkins 2014) .
It validates many intuitively plausible principles of justification as well as certain controversial ones, without compromising its neutrality on the aforementioned issues.
Its initial motivation does not depend on any assumptions extraneous to the account itself. However, it makes propositional justification luminous, which conflicts with certain externalist views. Surprisingly, though, the account proves quite resilient in the light of recent anti-luminosity arguments. Accordingly, the jury is still out on whether it ultimately founders just because of its commitment to luminosity.
Preliminaries

Propositional vs doxastic justification
The notion of justification to be elucidated in what follows is one of propositional rather than doxastic justification. There may be justification for  in a given situation, even if no belief in  is formed in that situation. By contrast, doxastic justification requires a justified belief. Uncontroversially, a justified belief in  requires that  itself be justified. Doxastic justification thus implies propositional justification, but not vice versa.
The relation between propositional and doxastic justification is often further characterized thus: x propositionally justifies  in a given situation, only if any belief in , based on x in that situation, is a justified belief.
1 Plausibly, a belief is justified only if it is formed in non-question-begging ways. The alleged implication accordingly presupposes that one's belief in , formed on the basis of propositional justification for , cannot itself add to the propositional justification that there is for . For, one's belief always fully grounded in, and hence supervenes upon, the subject's internally individuated mental states. According to accessibilism, justification is always fully grounded in, and so supervenes upon, facts that are introspectively or reflectively accessible to the subject. On the intended conception of the relevant mental states, mentalism is often taken to imply accessibilism. (See, however, Conee and Feldman 2001; Wedgwood 2002: 352 .) The converse implication anyway fails, as basic logical truths are reflectively accessible; but arguably, very little besides internally individuated mental states is accessible by mere introspection. Internalism about knowledge then is the view that knowledge requires justification internalistically conceived.
Minimally characterized, externalism about justification is simply the denial of internalism about justification. After Gettier, even internalists concede that knowledge requires that certain external conditions be met. Externalism about knowledge thus is best construed as the denial of internalism about knowledge.
That propositional justification need not always be grounded in factive states is compatible with externalism as thus understood. Certain visible rock formations may justify the claim that there once was volcanic activity nearby, even if these formations did not result from volcanic eruptions but from some freak incident of an altogether different nature. Similarly, perceptible traces of slime on the pavement may justify the claim that the neighbourhood is infested with slugs, and yet on this occasion be the manifestations of an alien fungus. Neither rock formations nor slimy traces supervene upon internally individuated mental states, nor are they already accessible by reflection or introspection alone.
Justification as a prerequisite of being in a position to know
It will be assumed that one's being in a position to know  in a given situation requires that  be propositionally justified in that situation. If we let K be short for 'one is in a position to know' (rather than 'one knows'), we can accordingly lay down
Plausibly, to the extent that K-J holds, knowledge requires doxastic justification. One's knowing  implies one's being in a position to know . It likewise implies one's believing . Doxastic justification implies propositional justification. It would be odd if one could not know  if  was not justified, and yet could know  even if one's belief in  was not based on the justification that there is for . If one could know , although one ignored the propositional justification for  in forming one's belief in , why would the existence of propositional justification for  be any precondition for one's knowledge of ?
Proponents of Williamson's knowledge-first approach should not, eo ipso, have any misgivings about K-J, even if propositional justification is here understood to be nonfactive. They are anyway happy to concede that one's knowledge of  implies both that  is true and that one believes  (Williamson 2000) . These concessions do not undermine their claim that, in the order of explanation, knowledge is both conceptually and metaphysically prior to any combinations of other epistemic notions that might be proffered in an attempt to analyse, or reduce, knowledge. To add K-J is not yet to add anything that would bring us any closer to such an analysis or reduction. Similarly, just as there is no pressure on the proponents of the knowledge-first approach to explain truth or belief in terms of knowledge, although knowledge implies truth and belief, there would seem to be no pressure on them to explain justification in terms of knowledge,
Proponents of the knowledge-first approach may still harbour doubts about whether any such notion of justification -a notion that would, moreover, be apt for explanatory work -is forthcoming. These doubts will be allayed in what follows.
All-things-considered vs pro tanto justification
Justification will be assumed to be justification all things considered. While there may be both pro tanto justification for  and pro tanto justification for ¬, it is ruled out that there is all-things-considered justification for both  and ¬. If the pro tanto reasons for  (¬) prevail, ¬ () is not justified overall. If the pro tanto reasons for  and ¬, respectively, are on a par, neither is justified overall. If there are no pro tanto reasons at all for either of  and ¬, again, neither is justified overall. In other words, it will be assumed that the following principle holds:
is not all that the notion of all-things-considered justification encodes. Reasons for ¬ are not the only factors that, on balance, can outweigh or weaken the pro tanto reasons for , so as to preclude that  is justified overall. There may also be reasons for thinking that one's pro tanto reasons for  are misbegotten or too weak (cf. Pollock and Cruz 1999; Bergmann 2005) . Insofar as justification is here understood to be epistemic, all-things-considered justification for the thought that one is in no position to know  on the basis of one's pro tanto reasons for , if any, should correspondingly be understood 2 Given that the relevant notion of justification is epistemic, proponents of the knowledge-first approach may nonetheless be prone to looking for a reductive account of justification in terms of knowledge. Note, though, that the epistemic nature of justification may already be guaranteed by principles like K-J and others to be discussed below, where these principles need not conspire to yield a reductive account.
to undercut their power to bestow all-things-considered justification on . Accordingly, we lay down:
(1) J¬K  ¬J It will be assumed that any structural account of non-factive propositional all-thingsconsidered justification must have the resources to vindicate (1), D J and K-J.
Desiderata for a structural account of justification
The goal accordingly is to devise an account of justification that is propositional, nonfactive and all-things-considered and underwrites K-J, D J and (1). These general features still allow for different precisifications of the notion, and the account to be devised offers only one such precisification.
Being structural, the account aims to be as neutral as possible on the question of which kinds of fact ground justification, and so on what it is that justification materially consists in. Given that K-J holds, it is therefore natural to lay down the following desideratum:
[D1] The account should be compatible both with internalism and with externalism about justification and knowledge.
Recall that externalism was minimally characterised as the denial of internalism. As such it allows for different concretizations.
[D1] should not be understood to demand that the account be consistent with all externalist views. To meet [D1], it will be enough if the account neither implies nor precludes that justification is fully grounded in internally individuated mental states or in facts that are already introspectively or reflectively accessible.
This observation matters, because the account will remain as faithful as possible to the job description that internalists commonly assign to justification, viz. that it make beliefs, appropriately formed on its basis, epistemically responsible. Not all externalist views will be concerned with this job description, which finding is consistent with the idea that there is such a notion available even to externalists.
Ever since its first detailed defence by Williamson (2000) , the knowledge-first approach has gained a considerable number of supporters. Accordingly, in order to ensure that the account is of broad enough interest to epistemologists, we should accept the following:
[D2] The account should be compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with rejection of that approach.
These are not the only desiderata. The debate between contextualists and invariantists about knowledge is still unresolved. 3 A structural account of justification should take no sides, but allow for implementation of the idea that the standards for knowledge vary from context to context; thus:
[D3] The account should be compatible both with invariantism and with contextualism about knowledge.
As indicated, an account of justification, as this notion is here being understood, should have the resources to vindicate K-J, D J and (1). But a structural account of justification should do more than this; thus:
[D4] The account should license independently plausible principles of justification, including K-J, D J and (1), and help to decide controversies about others. However, once backed by a suitable epistemic logic, the account should have the resources to sanction the principles, if any, on which its initial motivation depends; thus:
[D5] The account should not rely, for its initial rationale, on any principles of justification that it cannot be shown to imply.
This completes our list of desiderata against which to assess the structural account of justification to be proposed. If the account can be shown to meet all of them, this is already a considerable feat. There may be further desiderata which the account proves to have trouble fulfilling. Whether there are any such further desiderata is left for future work to ascertain.
The notion of being in a position to know, and its logic
Principle K-J already links justification to the notion of being in a position to know. As adumbrated, the background logic presupposed in what follows is a logic governing this notion. We therefore must clarify how this notion is to be understood and outline which axioms and rules it is, minimally, assumed to underwrite. Later, we will add to this axiomatic base in systematic ways.
Roughly, being in a position to know  is like knowing , but with the condition that  be believed systematically being replaced by the condition that one be physically and psychologically capable of believing . It already follows from this rough characterization that knowing implies being in a position to know, but not vice versa.
Standard epistemic logics are logics governing the notion of knowledge. Since knowledge requires belief, these logics are typically bound to make strong assumptions about the psychology of subjects. Such assumptions are largely irrelevant to epistemology. A logic of being in a position to know, by contrast, abstracts from the doxastic states of subjects.
Given the aforementioned characterization, it likewise follows that one is only ever in a position to know what is the case. Thus, like knowledge but unlike justification, being in a position to know is factive. Again using K as short for 'one is in a position to know' (rather than 'one knows'), we thus lay down:
Accordingly, one's being in a position to know  differs from its being possible for one to know . But it also differs from its being possible for one to know  where  is guaranteed to be an actual truth. For, unlike the latter, being in a position to know  implies that 's being the case is 'open to one's view, unhidden, even if one does not yet see it' (Williamson 2000: 95) . 4 Standard epistemic logics presuppose the rule of necessitation according to which all logical theorems are known (Hintikka 1962; cf. also Lenzen 1978) . These logics likewise presuppose that if    is a logical theorem, then if  is known,  is known.
The idealisations inherent in these rules are two-fold: not only are subjects said to have the resources to know what follows from what, they are furthermore said to be aware of what follows from what, using these resources. The logic for being in a position to know only makes the first kind of idealisation, leaving what is believed to one side. To this extent at least, it is less demanding. We thus lay down:
These rules still require extremely strong idealisations -an issue to which we will return in due course.
Standard epistemic logics are normal modal logics: they not only include RN K and
Accordingly, in standard epistemic logics, RM K is a derived rule. The logic for being in a position to know cannot be normal. To see this, reflect first that if we also had K K in addition to RN K , we could derive the principle according to which K agglomerates over conjunction, i.e.
K & K  K( & )
Next note that where  is 'No one ever knows ', the conjunction  &  cannot possibly be known, given only that knowledge is factive and distributes over conjunction (Fitch 1963) . Plausibly, if it is impossible for one to know a given proposition, one is not in a position to know that proposition either. But for all that, one may both be in a position to know  and be in a position to know . Just let  be a fleeting truth of little interest, e.g. that there are exactly seven blossoms on the bougainvillea, in a context where 'the fact is open to one's view, unhidden, even if one
does not yet see it' (Williamson 2000: 95) , and one knows that a storm is about to hit, that one is presently the only one around, and also, by introspection, that one is far too unconcerned ever to form any belief about the matter (Heylen 2016; Rosenkranz 2016a ).
Failure of K K implies that the logic for K is non-normal. This inter alia means that we cannot give a standard Kripkean semantics for it. Something like a neighbourhood semantics is needed instead (Chellas 1980 ). This is not the place to devise such a semantics, though.
There are other principles, familiar from modal logic, that are bound to fail in the case of K. Among these are
B K wrongly predicts that the truth of a proposition is always sufficient in order for one to be in a position to discard any claim to knowledge of its negation -which it evidently is not, since one's evidence may be misleading. 5 K wrongly predicts that whenever one's evidence is misleading, one is in a position to know that it is.
On any mildly externalist construal of being in a position to know, whether one is in that position may depend on environmental conditions, and as long as  does not entail that such conditions prevail, one may be in a position to know  without being in a position to know that one is in that position. The account to be proposed is meant to be neutral on the issue of whether externalism is true. Hence, the following principle should be resisted:
For the time being, we will only assume T K , RN K and RM K as part of the logic for K.
Later we will consider an extension of this minimal base. It is understood to be a constraint on this extension that none of K K , B K , 5 K and 4 K becomes derivable in the process. However, since no formal semantics will here be provided, demonstration that the account meets this constraint will have to await another occasion. 5
Idealisations
As indicated, RN K and RM K require very strong idealisations. Subjects are assumed to be in a position to know each and every logical theorem, and likewise each and every
logical consequence of what they are in a position to know. This inter alia implies that subjects are presumed to have all the conceptual resources necessary to grasp each and every proposition expressible in the language. To these idealisations we add yet another.
Thus, it will henceforth be assumed that subjects never fail to be in a position to know a given proposition already because they suffer from what would count as physical or psychological deficiencies, e.g. impairments of their sensory apparatus, lack of intellectual sophistication, inattentiveness, drunkenness, madness, death, etc. They may still fail to be in that position for other reasons, e.g. because they lack relevant information, or because the prevailing circumstances are not knowledge-conducive, or because being in a position to know requires a safety margin, or because the proposition in question is false or structurally unknowable.
Idealisations do no harm, as long as they are flagged as idealisations. However, any such idealisation makes it harder to explain what relevance the resultant logic has for ordinary subjects (cf. Williamson 1993; Stalnaker 2006: 172) . This is the kind of question we cannot address here. For present purposes, and with hindsight, it may suffice to point out that we are here ultimately interested in an account of propositional justification in terms of K. As long as we do not assume that whenever a given proposition is justified in one's situation, one can easily avail oneself of this justification, irrespective of any further assumptions about one's epistemic capacities, the idealisations inherent in the characterisation of K need not automatically render the account of propositional justification irrelevant for the case of less than ideal subjects.
A structural account of justification
Equivalence E
The account of justification to be proposed is a combination of two theses. The first is:
Here is an initial rationale for E 1 . If there is all-things-considered justification for  in one's situation, then one cannot, in that situation, be in a position to know that this justification fails to have the right kind of pedigree or is obtained under unfavourable conditions or is otherwise insufficient to underwrite one's aspirations to know. For, in order for one to be in that position, there would have to be some information or some discernible feature of one's epistemic situation that outbalanced or undermined the justification for , in which case the justification for  would not be justification all things considered (cf. Williamson 2000: 255-56; Smithies 2012c: 738) .
This informal reasoning would seem to presuppose both K-J and (1). It remains to be seen whether these presuppositions can be redeemed, just as both [D4] and [D5] demand.
The second thesis is the converse of the first, i.e.
We have already idealised away physical and psychological deficiencies, conceptual limitations and limitations on reasoning power. So E 2 is not already refuted by trees, dogs, small infants, or madmen. 6 To initially motivate E 2 , let us first ask what an epistemic situation must be like in which subjects, so idealised, are in no position to know that they are in no position to know . It cannot be a situation in which, if only one surveyed all the available information and was responsive to all the discernible features of one's situation, one would come to know that they failed to provide  with sufficient support -which arguably would already be the case if all the available information and discernible features failed to bear on the matter at all or supported ¬ at 6 The present account is not the first that seeks to characterize an epistemic phenomenon in purely negative terms. For example, Martin explores a disjunctivist view according to which 'there is no more to the phenomenal character' of visual hallucinations 'than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding visual perceptions' (Martin 2006: 369) . For a discussion of the corresponding problem posed by beings with degraded epistemic powers, and of the role of idealizations in solving it, see Martin (2006: 373-87) , Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006: 164-74 ) and Sturgeon (2006: 195-98) . See also the ex negativo account of belief discussed in Lenzen (1979) , Stalnaker (2006) and Halpern et al. (2009) , which is structurally just like E and which we will briefly comment on in §4.1 below.
least as strongly as . What else, then, might block one's path to knowing that one is in no position to know ?
Plausibly, some information must be available, or some feature of one's situation must be discernible, that, whether it be knowledge-conferring or not, favours  all things considered -and does so to such a degree that knowledge that it is too weak a justification for , or lacks the right pedigree required for knowledge of , or is acquired under conditions that are not knowledge-conducive, etc. is foreclosed. Such information or feature constitutes all-things-considered justification for .
This informal reasoning would seem to presuppose the following principle:
(2) ¬J  K¬J It remains to be seen whether the account ultimately sanctions (2), just as [D5]
demands. It also remains to be seen whether its reliance on (2) makes the account vulnerable to principled objections.
Note that with E 2 in place, K-J can immediately be established. By the factivity of K, i.e. T K , and contraposition, we have (3) K  ¬K¬K which latter, together with E 2 , yields K-J. With both (1) and E 2 in place, we could also straightforwardly derive (4) J¬K  K¬K (4) has a certain plausibility. Even if J¬K is grounded in misleading information to the effect that the prevailing circumstances are not conducive to knowledge of , the mere availability of this misleading information is enough to put one in a position to know that one is in no position to know . For the de facto misleading nature of the information is immaterial. One is anyway in a position to know, in its light, that one is not in a position to know , since its availability is already enough to put one in a position to know that there is no all-things-considered justification for . This line of reasoning, if cogent, also sucessfully undermines Smithies' alleged counterexample to E 2 (Smithies 2012b: 270) . However, the reasoning still depends on the assumption of (2); and it remains to be seen whether this assumption can in the end be vindicated.
So far on the intuitive rationale for E 1 and E 2 . They jointly yield the equivalence
Ultimately, the justification for E will depend on its power to fulfill the aforementioned desiderata, and in particular on its inferential potential, given a suitable logic for K.
Fulfilling desiderata [D1] to [D3]
E is silent on whether propositional justification supervenes upon the subject's internally individuated mental states (mentalism). It is likewise silent on whether all factors relevant for propositional justification are already introspectively or reflectively accessible (accessibilism). E would thus seem neutral with respect to the controversy between internalists and externalists about knowledge and justification, thereby
Thus, according to E, subjects who are connected to the Matrix but are otherwise fully functional have justification for the claim that they have hands, since they are in no position to know that they are in no position to know that they have hands. The only facts accessible to them are facts that are accessible to them through introspection or reflection. Plausibly, therefore, the justification such subjects have available for the claim that they have hands is grounded in such facts. Indeed, it is the induced inner appearance as of having hands that, in the absence of defeaters, stops them from being in a position to know that they are in no position to know that they have hands.
However, there is no pressure to conclude that the justification we have for the claim that we have hands is likewise grounded in introspectively or reflectively accessible facts, such as easily available inner appearances as of having hands. For, what stops us from being in a position to know that we are in no position to know that we have hands is that we are in a position to see that we have hands. Arguably, being in a position to see is a case of being in a position to know (cf. Williamson 2000: 34) . Accordingly,
given K-J, whenever one is in a position to see that one has hands, one has propositional justification for the claim that one has hands. Such a justification, grounded in seeing, is unavailable to subjects connected to the Matrix, but it is nonetheless available to us.
E is controversial. However, to the extent that propositional justification is what makes beliefs, appropriately formed on its basis, epistemically responsible (see §1.5),
propositional justification, and its absence, should be something believers can in principle be responsive to and appreciate on occasion of forming their beliefs. Thus understood, E should seem less contentious, even to externalists. This is not to say that E coheres with all externalist views, e.g. ones according to which justification depends on objective features whose absence in a given situation cannot even empirically be ascertained in that situation. However, in the light of the minimal characterisation of externalism given in §1.2, compliance with [D1] does not require coherence with such views.
Although E is assumed to be a necessary equivalence, there is no presumption that it yields a conceptual or any other kind of reduction of justification. But E surely leaves room for such a reduction. If E is consistent with the reducibility of justification in terms of K, it is a fortiori consistent with the knowledge-first approach. E is therefore compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. E thus fulfills desideratum [D2].
E allows for, but does not entail, contextual variation in the standards for knowledge.
It thus fulfills desideratum [D3]. In fact, E provides an explanation of why, if the standards for knowledge vary, so do the standards for justification. If it becomes easier to be in a position to know , because the standards for K are lowered, it becomes comparatively harder to be in a position to know that one is in no position to know , and so comparatively easier not to be in that position. Hence, given E, the standards for J are correspondingly lowered. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for a raising of standards.
Towards fulfilling desiderata [D4] and [D5]
We have already seen how K-J can be derived with the help of E and
Besides T K , the minimal logic for K also comprises the two rules
Once E is added, the following two rules can accordingly be established:
which straightforwardly follows from K-J and RN K , and
Proof: Let    be a theorem. Then by RM K , so is K  K. By contraposition and another application of RM K , this yields K¬K  K¬K. By contraposition and E, J  J follows.
With RM J in place, we can now easily prove the following two highly plausible principles of justification:
The addition of E likewise allows us to prove all of the following: This is good news, since (7) to (9) are eminently plausible (Smithies 2012a: 283-84) .
7
E explains why T J should fail: J is not factive, because ¬K¬K is not factive. The axiomatic base for K includes none of K K , B K , 5 K and 4 K . E shows why B K and 5 K are both bad. Given E, each of B K and 5 K would make justification factive. E likewise shows why 4 K is problematical, for given E, 4 K would entail J  JK. Yet, the justification for  may be altogether silent on whether the environmental conditions are conducive to knowing  on its basis.
8
For all that, the account would so far seem to be incomplete, as we still need to derive all of the following
In the next section, an extension of the minimal logic for K is considered and defended against objections. This extension allows for the derivation of (1), (2) and D J . As we shall see, it also allows for the derivation of potentially more controversial principles of justification that are often taken to presuppose internalism.
Justification as luminous
The luminosity principle
It was part of the initial characterisation of non-factive propositional all-thingsconsidered justification, given in §1, that
(1) J¬K  ¬J holds. By E and contraposition, (1) 
Fulfilment of desiderata [D1] to [D3]
Addition of Lum does not affect the account's neutrality with respect to the debate between internalists and externalists that [D1] demands. Lum is consistent with the idea that one's propositional justification for the claim that one has hands is grounded in one's seeing that one has hands, while one may nonetheless not be in a position to know that the environmental conditions are conducive to seeing. Even if justification is luminous, the grounds of justification may not be luminous. Just like subjects connected to the Matrix, one may be in a position to know ¬K¬K(One has hands), without being in a position to know that one sees that one has hands.
Again, this is not to say that addition of Lum can be made to cohere with any externalist view, e.g. one according to which justification depends on features whose presence in a given situation cannot even empirically be ascertained in that situation.
However, in the light of the minimal characterisation of externalism given in §1. 
Towards fulfilling desideratum [D4]: further proofs
Adding Lum to T K , RN K , RM K and E allows us to derive D J and a host of other principles of justification:
Proof: By T K , contraposition and RM K , we obtain K  K¬K¬, whence by contraposition and another application of RM K , we derive K¬K¬K¬  K¬K. By Lum, we have ¬K¬K¬  K¬K¬K¬. So by the transitivity of , ¬K¬K¬  K¬K follows. Given E, this is equivalent to D J .
(11) JJ  J Proof: By T K , we get K¬K  ¬K¬K¬K. By Lum, we obtain ¬K¬K¬K  K¬K¬K¬K. By the transitivity of , K¬K  K¬K¬K¬K follows, whence by contraposition, we obtain ¬K¬K¬K¬K  ¬K¬K. Given E, this is equivalent to (11).
J J  JJ
Proof: Assume J, i.e. given E, ¬K¬K, whence by Lum, K¬K¬K follows. Now assume for reductio ¬JJ, i.e. given E, K¬K¬K¬K, whence by T K , ¬K¬K¬K follows. Contradiction! Thus, 4 J holds.
(12) J¬J  ¬J Proof: By K-J, contraposition and RM J , we have J¬J  J¬K. Given E, Lum is equivalent to (1), i.e. J¬K  ¬J. By the transitivity of , (12) follows.
J ¬J  J¬J
Proof: By Lum, ¬K¬K  K¬K¬K, whence by contraposition, ¬K¬K¬K  K¬K. From this, by RM K , we obtain K¬K¬K¬K  KK¬K, which by contraposition yields ¬KK¬K  ¬K¬K¬K¬K. From the latter, by E and (11), ¬KK¬K  ¬K¬K follows. Now assume ¬J, i.e. given E, K¬K. Assume for reductio, ¬J¬J, i.e. given E, K¬KK¬K, whence by T K , ¬KK¬K follows. By the foregoing, the latter yields ¬K¬K. Contradiction! Thus, 5 J holds. Smithies (2012a: 296-99) argues that (11), (12), 4 J and 5 J are best explained by mentalist internalism. Their derivability from externalist-friendly premises shows that this contention is mistaken. Smithies would seem to rely on the questionable assumption, rejected above, that if facts about justification are luminous, so must be their grounds, or on the equally questionable assumption that the luminosity of such facts requires these facts themselves to be already accessible by introspection or reflection alone.
There is no reason to expect that, after addition of Lum, the unwanted principles T J , K K , B K , 5 K and 4 K suddenly become derivable. However, without a suitable formal semantics, we admittedly remain short of a demonstration that none of these principles can be derived. 
Fulfilling desideratum [D5]
With Lum in place, we can finally redeem the remaining presupposition underlying the initial rationale for E, i.e.
(2) ¬J  K¬J Proof: We have already proved (12), i.e. J¬J  ¬J. By RM K , we accordingly have KJ¬J  K¬J. By Lum and E, J¬J  KJ¬J. By the transitivity of , this yields J¬J  K¬J. Given 5 J , (2) follows.
Given (2), we accordingly now also have:
Thus, the account fulfils desideratum [D5] and hence does not, by way of motivation, presuppose anything that it cannot redeem.
Margin-for-error principles
However, Lum is controversial, as a cursory look into the recent epistemological literature confirms. Thus, consider what happens once we conjoin (10) J  KJ with the margin-for-error principle
where  and  are relevantly close cases that differ only marginally in whatever factors conspire to determine whether or not  is justified. It takes little to see that we obtain the soritical
Hence M K puts pressure on Lum. Williamson (2000) derives margin-for-error principles for K from corresponding margin-for-error principles for knowledge. Let k be short for 'one knows'; then the principle corresponding to M K is
where here, as before,  and  are relevantly close in that they differ only marginally in whatever factors conspire to determine whether or not  is justified. Principles like M k are motivated by the idea that one's knowledgeable belief must be safe, in the sense that there must be no easy possibility of one's believing falsely.
However, unlike , K does not require that  be believed. In order to derive principles like M K from principles like M k , Williamson (2000: 128) appeals to principles of the kind exemplified by # If one is in a position to know J in case , there is a case  such that, in , one does know J and, in ,  is justified on the basis of the very same factors as in  -so that whatever cases are relevantly close to  are relevantly close to  and vice versa.
Friends of Lum accordingly have two main lines of response available: either they reject the margin-for-error principles for knowledge, i.e. M k , or they reject #. Important work has already been done in pursuit of the first strategy (Berker 2008; Zardini 2012) . Here, I intend to pursue the second and cast doubts on #.
Being in a position to know requires propositional justification but no justified belief.
By contrast, knowledge requires doxastic justification, and hence a justified belief. J encodes propositional rather than doxastic justification. As argued in §1.1, a competent subject's justified belief in  may add to the strength of the propositional justification that there is for  in a given situation. Let  be J. Given its commitment to (11), i.e.
JJ  J, the account under scrutiny allows that a strengthening of the justification for J provides a strengthening of the justification for , as long as the latter is not already as strong as it can get (which close to the borderline it is not). Objections to a given account should not underestimate its resources. On the account under scrutiny, what is relevantly close to cases in which no justified belief in J is formed may accordingly not be relevantly close to cases in which such a justified belief is formed. Thus, unless M K can independently be motivated, we may reject it while still accepting M k . Without M K , there is so far no argument against Lum.
Thus, for all that has been said, one may well be in a position to know the last case of only if  holds at all times within the interval n  5min, i.e.
Let 't 0 ' abbreviate 'the present time' so that (t 0 = n) n , for all n. Then M K entails
For, if n  m, the proposition that the present time lies within the interval m  5min will not hold at all times within the interval n  5min; and trivially, the proposition that the present time is distinct from m does not hold at m.
11 It would follow that one can never know all one is in a position to know. Let the superscript in 'necessary i 'encode i-1 iterations of 'necessary'. It would follow that Lum won't be necessary n for all n, if some ¬J-case in the series is not even possibly m a J-case, for some m. For then it won't hold that for every case x, every n and every possible n circumstance in which one is in a position to know x to be a J-case, where x is the last such case in the series, there is a possible n+1 circumstance in which one knows x to be a J-case and some case later than x is the last J-case. For all that, Lum might still be necessary. 12 Although he puts these points in terms of knowledge, certain passages suggest that Williamson intends them to likewise apply to K (e.g. Williamson 2014: 972) .
Again following Williamson, assume in addition that at time n, one is indeed in a position to know by looking that the present time lies within the interval n  5min, i.e.
(15) K(t 0  {n  5min}) n Let p be the proposition that the present time lies within the interval 4 o'clock  5min.
From (13) and (15), we derive
Since the clock is extremely precise and accurate, there will be a huge number of possible pointer positions corresponding to times within the interval 4 o'clock  5min which, given (14), one is in no position to rule out as candidates for being present.
Given suitable background assumptions, it follows that at 4 o'clock, it is almost certain on one's evidence that it isn't 4 o'clock. To the extent that (16) is known, it would seem that, at 4 o'clock, it is almost certain on one's evidence that Kp is false. Since, plausibly, one cannot be in a position to know something whose falsity is almost certain on one's evidence, at 4 o'clock, KKp fails, whence it would follow that Kp is not luminous (Williamson 2014: 979-81) .
Even so, at 4 o'clock, it does not equally seem to be almost certain on one's evidence that Jp is false. For given E, this would require that it then be almost certain on one's evidence that one is in a position to know that one is in no position to know p -and so,
given (16), that one is in a position to know conditions to prevail that prevail iff it isn't 4 o'clock. Such a diagnosis would seem entirely unwarranted.
This rejoinder might be thought too quick as an attempt to salvage Lum. To begin with, note that from the foregoing we can derive (14) is, for all one is in a position to know, present.
Likewise, at any time m outside the interval 4 o'clock  5min, 4 o'clock lies outside the interval m  5min, and so by (15) and RM K , one is in a position to know it not to be present.
Let us now assume that one is in a position to know (17), and also in a position to know that one is in a position to know (16), i.e. K(17) & KK(16). Focusing on k rather than K, Williamson (2014: 973-79 ) assumes an epistemic logic that is normal. If we similarly had
we could, by contraposition, infer from K(16) -and hence by T K , also from KK (16) This argument against Lum not only assumes that one is in a position to know (17) and that one is in a position to know that one is in a position to know (16) -which may be contested -it also makes heavy-duty use of K K . We already know that K K is bound to fail (see §1.6) and so need not be overly impressed by this argument.
It might at first seem that this defence of Lum is ad hoc, because even if K K does not in general hold, certain of its instances may after all do. Yet, arguably, failure of K K in the present context has nothing in particular to do with Lum. Suppose that one is in a position to know (17). Given (16), K K would then imply
But even at one minute past 4 o'clock, it may persistently seem to one that, for all one is in a position to tell by looking at the unmarked clock, it is 4 o'clock. Plausibly, it can be taken as known that as long as one enjoys such an appearance, with nothing to discount it, it blocks one's path to knowing that it isn't 4 o'clock. But then, by another application of K K , being in a position to know, at one minute past 4 o'clock, that one enjoys such an appearance, with nothing to discount it, should put one in a position to know that one is in no position to know that it isn't 4 o'clock -which would contradict (22) (cf. Rosenkranz 2016b for further discussion).
4. Why the logic for J cannot be normal
Normality and the agglomeration of J over conjunction
Before closing, let us consider whether the resultant logic for J can be a normal modal logic. This question is of more than merely technical interest, since the logic for J is normal just in case J agglomerates over conjunction; and the question whether J so agglomerates is undoubtedly of philosophical interest. Given RN J , if we also had
the resultant logic for J would be normal. We next prove that K J is equivalent to By E and contraposition, (23) is in turn equivalent to
Thus, the logic for J will be normal iff J agglomerates over conjunction iff Agg holds. In the context of a normal modal logic for K, Agg would define a class of Kripke frames with the following property: xy 1 y 2 (xRy 1 & xRy 2  y 3 (xRy 3 & z(y 3 Rz  y 1 Rz & y 2 Rz))). 13 Although this is ultimately of limited interest, since the logic for K is agreed not to be normal, this observation might still help to clarify the import of Agg.
Agg implies Lum, and hence its addition would make separate addition of Lum
superfluous:
Proof: Assume J and assume for reductio ¬KJ. From the latter, by E, J¬K follows. By Agg, this together with the first assumption yields J( & ¬K) -which contradicts (7), i.e. ¬J( & ¬K). Lum follows.
Accordingly, by combining E with Agg, we could still derive D J , 4 J and 5 J , as we did in §3.3, but would now have K J in addition. Lenzen (1979) , Stalnaker (2006) and Halpern et al. (2009) consider the principle B  ¬k¬ k, where B is short for 'one believes', and show that, once supplemented by this principle, normal epistemic logics for k stronger than S4 but weaker than S5 allow us to derive KD45 for B. 14 The principle in question is structurally just like E. The foregoing shows that the same result can be obtained using a non-normal epistemic logic distinct from any logic that is at least as strong as S4.
The addition of Agg is, however, highly problematical; and ultimately, the logic for J cannot be normal, and J does not agglomerate over conjunction. This will be argued in the remainder.
Lotteries and the preface
Given E, Agg is equivalent to (23). Many critics point to the preface and lottery paradoxes in order to discredit (23). But given E, these criticisms would seem to misfire.
First consider lotteries (Kyburg 1961: 197) . Arguably, one is in a position to know that one is in no position to know that one's ticket will lose. So given E, lotteries present no clear counterexamples to (23).
14 In order to prove this result, these authors assume the epistemic logic S4.4, where 4.4 k is   (¬k¬k  k). Jointly with B  ¬k¬k, 4.4 k entails k  ( & B), which is highly implausible given Gettier cases. However, in this context, Lenzen (1979: 42) and Stalnaker (2006: 179-80 ) also consider the epistemic logic S4.2, where S4.2 results from S4 by adding Geach's axiom. In the end, this is no better: as argued, given only the mildest forms of externalism about knowledge, S4 is too strong to serve as an epistemic logic.
Next consider the preface paradox (Makinson 1965) . Given E, for an author not to have justification for the conjunction of all the propositions composing her treatise, she must be in a position to know that she is in no position to know this conjunction. But how can past records of her fallibility put her in a position to know that she fails to know on this occasion? She would have to have an independent grip on how the relative frequency of falsehoods among the presently believed propositions compares to the relative frequency of falsehoods among the propositions believed in the past. Yet, she has no such independent grip. For all she is in a position to know, on this occasion she gets everything right (cf. Rosenkranz 2015: 637-38 ).
It thus is unclear whether, with E in place, the preface and lottery paradoxes provide counterexamples to (23). It is thus equally unclear whether they can serve to discredit Agg.
Why J does not agglomerate over conjunction
But Agg is bad for reasons that are independent from its equivalence to (23). Here is one such reason. Plausibly, K¬K( & No one ever knows ) holds. Yet, once both Agg and T K are assumed, it follows that K and K(No one ever knows ) cannot simultaneously hold -which, as already argued in §1.6, is highly implausible on the intended interpretation of K (Heylen 2016; Rosenkranz 2016a Accordingly, Agg ultimately fails and so does K J . Hence J does not agglomerate over conjunction, and just like the logic for K, the logic for J cannot be normal.
Conclusion
The proposed structural account of non-factive propositional all-things-considered justification comprises the following five principles governing the notion of being in a position to know:
Given its commitment to RN K and RM K , the account involves hefty idealisationsidealisations which are, however, familiar from more standard epistemic logics.
Embodying a non-normal logic for K, it yields a logic with D45 as the non-normal logic for J. The account is neutral on whether justification is fully grounded in internally individuated mental states or in facts that are already introspectively or reflectively 
